Chiang Kai-shek’s “secret deal” at Xian and the start of the Sino-Japanese War by Tsang, Steve
1 
 
  
Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘secret deal’ at Xian and the Start of the 
Sino-Japanese War 
 
Abstract 
 
 Using newly available archives, particularly the diary and the presidential 
papers of Chiang Kai-shek this article challenges the conventional interpretations of 
the Xian Incident (1936), in particular the widely held belief that the  kidnapping of 
China’s leader Chiang by two rebellious generals forced him to form a united front 
with the Communist Party to confront Japanese aggression, and of the outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese War seven months later. It puts forth the interpretation that full-
scale war between China and Japan was started not by Japan but by Chiang after a 
Japanese provocation, and the united front was only formed after Chiang ordered his 
best army units to attack Japanese forces in Shanghai in August 1937 turning it into 
the largest land battle after the first world war, It must be noted, however, that Japan 
acted provocatively and aggressively in a local incident outside Beijing a month 
earlier. Chiang decided on war not because he reached an agreement with the 
Chinese Communists to form a united front whilst a captive in Xian but because in 
Xian he received a signal from Josef Stalin that the Soviet Union would support him 
in a war with Japan. Chiang read Stalin right and the Soviet Union became the 
largest supplier of weapons to China in the first four years of China’s eight year war 
with Japan. The hitherto unknown or ‘secret’ deal Chiang made in Xian was an 
implicit one with Stalin, not with the Chinese Communist Party or its man on the spot 
Zhou Enlai.  
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Why revisit this issue? 
 
The Xian Incident of December 1936 was an event of monumental importance.  
It caused the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) to rethink and, indeed, 
reverse his priorities that had major long term consequences. Until then he was 
committed to exterminate the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a prerequisite to 
building up the necessary national capacity for China to defend itself against Japan, 
and used compromises to slow down unrelenting Japanese aggressive moves in 
northern China. At Xian Chiang found out that a workable alternative existed for 
confronting Japanese aggression, which gave him the option to stand firm against 
the next Japanese aggressive move. As a result, when Japanese forces in north 
China provoked the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, Chiang did not appease 
the Japanese and took actions that transformed another local incident into the 
starting point of China’s War of Resistance against Japan (1937-45).  
 
This chain of events dramatically changed the fortune of the exhausted and 
heavily depleted CCP struggling to survive in the poor northwest of China. It enabled 
the CCP to revive and expand dramatically and exponentially during the War, 
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ultimately seizing control of the mainland of China in 1949. Without the Xian Incident 
it is doubtful if full scale war between China and Japan would have started in 1937, 
though it most probably could not have been avoided for long. Whether the CCP 
could otherwise have survived Chiang’s ‘final push’ in his extermination campaign 
cannot be known. What was certain was that the Incident enabled the CCP to 
reverse its fortune and get out of the blind alleyway to which it had been driven 
deeper and deeper by Chiang after 1934.1 Even though Chiang simultaneously 
conducted parallel covert negotiations with the CCP as well as the Soviet Union prior 
to the Incident, his programme to exterminate the CCP only ceased as a result of the 
dramatic events in Xian. It was a turning point for the CCP. Even top Communist 
leaders like Zhou Enlai saw it at the time.2 
 
Most existing scholarly works and personal accounts of the Incident focus on 
the intrigues and dramas in Xian, the CPP headquarters in Baoan, the Chinese 
capital Nanjing and the Soviet capital Moscow.3 Even though there is not one agreed 
narrative of the Xian Incident, the prevailing view is that while the CPP did not stage 
the incident it played a pivotal role through Zhou Enlai in ending it. It is widely 
believed that Zhou secured the release of Chiang Kai-shek by getting Chiang to 
agree to form a united front with the CCP against Japan. This formed the basis for 
China to stand firm against Japan the following summer when the Japanese 
capitalized on an incident in the Marco Polo Bridge area outside Beijing to stage a 
more general aggression in Shanghai, in respond to which Chiang led the Chinese 
nation to resist in a war that lasted eight years. This paper challenges this 
conventional wisdom. 
 
Fascinating as the drama in Xian is, the real significance of the incident is how 
it affected the Chinese government’s decision to respond when Japan made its next 
major aggressive move. Most works on the Sino-Japanese War glosse 
 over how China finally made a stand against unrelenting Japanese aggression;4 
Even those that relate the Xian Incident to the start of the War works on the basis 
that the Incident ‘radically changed the position of the Nationalist Government, as it 
indicated that Chiang could no longer force his anti-communist campaign on his 
military subordinates’ and seized on the ‘new mood of national unity’ and ‘resolved to 
resist any further Japanese provocation’.5 This overlooks the reality that Chiang 
could not decide to act on a matter with existential implications for the country just 
because the ‘national mood’ changed. The reality was that while the Incident did 
change Chiang’s sense of priority and that of his government there was a more 
powerful and decisive factor at work. 
 
The long standing official account of the Incident, based on what Chiang 
would like the world to think, asserts that the young Marshall Zhang Xueliang, who 
staged a mutiny and held Chiang captive in Xian, reversed course and freed Chiang 
as he was moved by how determined Chiang was to resist Japanese imperialism 
after reading Chiang’s Diary.6 This has rightly been discounted by Young-Tsu Wong. 
Wong also dismisses the alternative interpretation put forward by John Garver and 
Hans van de Ven that the Soviet Union played a key role in ending the kidnapping. 
Wang argues that Chiang was not ‘released by order of Moscow’ but ‘because he 
met Zhang’s demands.’7 In Wong’s revisionist assessment although Chiang ‘could 
have disregarded what he had agreed to do in Xi’an … his sudden rise in popularity 
upon his release, due to his identification now with the rising tide of anti-Japanese 
nationalism, made it more than ever difficult for him to oppose resistance in favor of 
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continuing the civil war.’8 But others, from Yang Kuisong to Jay Taylor prefer to 
stress the important role played by the Chinese Communist Party in ending the 
Incident.9 Apart from Taylor none of the others examined in any detail how Chiang 
reacted in captivity and why he made a deal. Nor did they probe into the link between 
the Incident and the start of the War. Taylor’s emphasis on the personal rapport 
between the Communist leader Zhou Enlai and Chiang as the key factor is, however, 
unconvincing. Chiang was too much of a realist and not enough of a sentimentalist 
for that. To settle the controversies over how the Incident was ended, one must 
examine how Chiang assessed his own predicament in captivity and the conditions 
for his release, and see how they impacted upon his decision to go to war with Japan 
the following summer. 
 
Newly available sources, the most important of which are Chiang Kai-shek’s 
diary at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and his presidential papers at 
the Academia Historica in Taipei, have now make it possible to re-evaluate the deal 
that Chiang made in Xian for his own release. Also valuable is the Xian Diary of T.V. 
Soong (also at the Hoover Institution) as he was the key intermediary who did most 
of the actual negotiation between Chiang and his captors.10 For this purpose Zhang’s 
oral history account at Columbia University and various publications based on 
interviews with him after he regained freedom are not particularly illuminating, as 
Zhang refused to speak about the Incident in detail.  
 
The deal was more complex than the mainstream interpretation that ‘Chiang’s 
hand was forced in December 1936, when he was kidnapped by … Zhang … [and as a 
result] came to an accord with the CCP, and the two sides agreed to hold back from 
conflict with each other, while waiting for any further moves from Japan.’11 On the 
basis of these recently available archival sources this paper sheds light on how 
Chiang assessed his predicament in captivity and secured his own release. It also 
examines how the settlement in Xian underpinned Chiang’s confidence to risk going 
to war with Japan before a ‘united front’ with the CCP was agreed.  
 
As it will be explained, there were in fact two parallel elements to ‘the deal’ 
that secured Chiang’s release. One was negotiated between Chiang’s agents and his 
real captors, which was what Young-Tsu Wong focused upon. The other, and from 
Chiang’s perspective the really important one, was an implicit understanding he 
thought he had with Stalin. There was no written agreement between Chiang and the 
CCP or the Soviet Union to form a united front against Japan though Chiang did 
make verbal undertakings to the Communists and his real captors. What Chiang 
thought was most important was, however, something else.  It was that he had 
ascertained in Xian the intentions of the Soviet leader Josef Stalin. As he tried to 
work out a basis for his own release Chiang came to the conclusion that Stalin would 
support him in a war against Japan, a matter about which he did not have confidence 
hitherto. This was crucial to Chiang’s decision to hold firm, half a year later, over an 
incident that involved the missing of a Japanese soldier on exercise in the Marco 
Polo Bridge area in the outskirt of Beijing on 7 July 1937. Since the missing soldier 
was found and tension eased, the scope for a settlement similar to what put an end 
to similar incidents in the previous few years existed. But Chiang decided to make a 
stand on this occasion, instead of appeasing the Japanese militarists as he had 
previously done. The big difference this time was that he now believed he could 
count on Soviet support in the event of escalation into a full scale war.  
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The raison d’être of this paper is not to review the plotters’ intentions, which 
cannot be established beyond doubt,12 though it does ascertain carefully the 
sequence of events leading to the mutiny, as well as the role the Chinese Communist 
Party and the Soviet Union played in ending it. In so doing, it challenges the 
mainstream view in recent Chinese scholarship, represented in particular by the work 
of Yang Kuisong, that the Chinese Communists acted on their own and not on 
Stalin’s instruction.13  By using the presidential papers and the personal diary of 
Chiang Kai-shek, and the accounts by Zhang Xueliang, it re-constructs the events 
that led to Zhang staging the kidnapping. While Zhang had contemplated such a 
drastic option for a few months the fateful decision was only made after a violent 
verbal confrontation between him and Chiang two days before the mutiny. By relying 
on the same original sources as well as T.V. Soong’s diary for the Xian Incident it 
also re-examines the role Zhou Enlai played. It argues that Jay Taylor’s conclusion 
that Zhou’s special personal relationship with Chiang was pivotal needs to be set in 
the context of realpolitik.14 Zhou’s diplomatic skills certainly helped to broker a deal 
but Chiang moved forward as he thought he had got an implicit understanding with 
Stalin, not because he had a special rapport with Zhou or trusted Zhou. 
 
 This paper further examines the nature of this implicit understanding Chiang 
thought he had with Stalin and why something apparently so tenuous was 
subsequently allowed to leave marks of great historical importance. It shows that 
while a captive in Xian, Chiang believed that he was albeit indirectly and only 
implicitly dealing with Stalin. He thought Stalin gave him to understand that if he 
would lead China in a united front against Japan, the Soviet Union would provide 
support. It was Chiang’s belief that Stalin would deliver on this understanding that 
gave him confidence to start a second front in Shanghai after the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident and commit the overwhelming majority of his best army against the 
Japanese in the largest land battle since the Great War. When he did so he also 
hoped this would persuade the West to seek to protect its own interests in Shanghai 
by brokering a peace favourable to China. But he was willing to risk escalation to full 
scale war only because he was confident that while the West would probably fail him 
Stalin would support him. As it turned out once the Japanese found it necessary to 
reinforce massively the Shanghai front against unexpectedly strong and effective 
Chinese military operations, the crisis escalated to a point that full scale war could no 
longer be avoided. This paper further shows that the ‘second united front’ between 
the Kuomintang and the CCP was not agreed at Xian but was hastily agreed after the 
Battle of Shanghai had already started.. 
 
The incident 
 
Chiang Kai-shek was personally aware that Zhang Xueling, leader of the Xian 
mutiny, had had dealings with the CCP almost immediately after Zhang and the CCP 
started their secret dialogues in January 1936, more than ten months before the Xian 
Incident.15  Indeed, it was the failure of forces under Zhang’s command to attack the 
remnants of the CCP in northwest China that took Chiang to Xian on 4 December 
1936. Chiang believed that by personally superintending Zhang’s command, he 
could require the Northeast Army (under Zhang’s command) and the 17th Route 
Army (a corps size unit under former Northwest Army general Yang Hucheng) to co-
operate with Central Army units in the region to deal a final crushing blow to the 
remnants of the CCP forces.  
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The mutiny and kidnapping took Chiang completely by surprise, though the 
risk that the Northeast Army might rebel did cross his mind in late November.16 When 
he was captured the first issue about which he sought clarification was whether his 
captors were from the Red Army.17 It was not until his captors explained they were 
from Zhang’s elite bodyguard regiment and were escorting him back to their 
commander that Chiang realized Zhang had really staged the mutiny. Chiang did not 
know Yang was a co-conspirator until he saw soldiers of the 17th Route Army on duty 
in the streets of Xian as he was being taken to Yang’s headquarters, where Zhang 
and Yang were.18 
 
Even though the attitude of the Soviet Union under Stalin and the CCP 
leadership were critical to finding a solution to the Xian Incident the mutiny was 
staged without their prior knowledge.19 This was notwithstanding the reality that the 
two key conspirators (generals Zhang and Yang) had significant parallel dealings 
with the CCP, and had hoped to secure Soviet military supplies if they could form 
some kind of a grand alliance including the CCP as a partner in northwest China. 
The idea of holding Chiang captive and forcing him to stop the civil war against the 
Communists and lead them in a war of resistance against Japan was originally put 
forward by Yang.20 Zhang was at first hesitant.  
 
Zhang, who lost his father to Japanese military assassins in 1928, had for 
some time been highly dissatisfied with Chiang’s determination to exterminate the 
Communist Party before resisting Japan. He had repeatedly tried to remonstrate with 
Chiang. His last attempt before Chiang arrived at Xian took place at the end of 
October 1936, when he did so with the backing of the strongly entrenched leader of 
Shanxi Yan Xishan.21 Chiang rebuffed them.  This was the end of the matter for Yan, 
but Zhang gained the mistaken impression that Yan would support him if he should 
act against Chiang’s central government.22 
 
What finally prompted Zhang and Yang to seriously consider this extreme 
measure was Chiang’s decision to take overall personal charge in Xian. This put 
them on the spot.23 They were presented with a choice of either implementing 
Chiang’s order to attack the CCP forces, with which they had a secret truce 
agreement, or be re-deployed to Fujian and Anhui respectively and face the 
consequences later.  Zhang and Yang thus explored the option of kidnapping Chiang 
in order to force him to abandon his ‘pacify the country first’ policy and adopt instead 
their ‘resist the external threat first’ approach. They did not reach an agreement to act 
in the first six to seven days of Chiang’s stay in Xian. 
 
The final decision to seize Chiang (and those senior generals who 
accompanied him to Xian) was made after Zhang and Chiang ended their meeting on 
10 December in an emotionally charged verbal altercation that revealed how 
irreconcilable their basic difference was.24 This took place the day after Zhang went 
to meet with students who went on a demonstration demanding the government 
resist Japanese aggression. Anti-Japanese sentiments among the educated 
population had been running high in the major cities of China in the autumn of 
1936.25  
 
When Zhang met student demonstrators on 9 December he was moved by 
their patriotism.26  Knowing that security forces had been ordered to suppress them if 
necessary Zhang pleaded with them to disperse and promised them that within a 
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week he would do something to show he had not let them down.27  
 
At their meeting the following day, on 10 December, Zhang tried to persuade 
Chiang as he had promised the student demonstrators. Chiang abusively dismissed 
Zhang’s recommendations as naive and touched a raw nerve that had been 
exercising Zhang. Chiang reportedly said the students who disturbed the peace and 
through their demonstrations sabotaged the government’s policy should be 
suppressed - by the use of firearm if necessary.28 Chiang himself remorsefully noted 
that evening that he had been too harsh and rough on Zhang, but he had no inkling 
how great an impact this emotionally charged meeting had.29 It led to Zhang deciding 
that the only way to persuade Chiang was to kidnap him and force him to agree to 
reverse the policy priorities. There is no evidence that Zhang had made up his mind 
before this dramatic verbal confrontation.  
 
Zhang wanted Chiang to lead the whole country to stand firm against an 
aggressive Japan before consolidating control in the country.30 The hastiness of the 
decision was reflected in the deployment of troops in Xian and in executing the coup. 
Zhang did not have time to move units of his substantially bigger and more powerful 
Northeast Army to Xian, which would have made sense if Zhang had decided to 
stage the mutiny sooner.31  The security of Xian at the time was in the hands of 
Yang’s 17th Route Army, not a long-standing ally of Zhang. Within the city Zhang had 
only one bodyguard regiment of the Northeast Army.32 When he finally decided to act 
Zhang took on the role and responsibility as the leader and invited Yang to serve as 
the deputy leader of the mutiny. Even though Yang had a substantially larger force in 
Xian that could be deployed to seize Chiang, Zhang sent his own relatively small unit 
of bodyguards instead.  
 
Yang did not order his men to join Zhang’s bodyguards in this critical 
operation. One cannot absolutely and totally rule out the possibility that the two 
leading mutineers trusted each other though it was unlikely. A much more likely 
explanation is that Zhang did not trust Yang’s forces with Chiang’s life, as he merely 
wanted to capture Chiang, not to kill or harm him.33 Zhang’s plan suited Yang as it 
gave him plausible deniability in case the mutiny should fail. In such an eventuality 
Yang had the option to turn on Zhang with superior force, putting all blame on Zhang, 
and stay on the right side of Chiang.  
 
Zhang’s troops tried to seize Chiang at his Xian residence in the early hours of 
12 December, less than 48 hours after their oral altercation. As his small detachment 
of bodyguards put up resistance, Chiang escaped by scaling a wall, badly hurting his 
back as he fell into a ditch in the dark and sought refuge on a hillside. He was found 
and taken prisoner before nine o’clock in the morning. 
 
Chiang’s initial reactions to his kidnapping took Zhang and Yang by surprise. 
Instead of opening negotiation, Chiang adamantly refused to discuss anything with 
them and declined food. In the moment of shock Chiang appeared to think at least as 
much about his place in history as his immediate safety. Whether it was in the hill 
where he was captured or in Yang’s headquarters Chiang insisted first and foremost 
on his dignity not being offended.34 No doubt he must have privately calculated that 
he was too great a prize for Zhang and Yang to execute on the spot. In any event his 
intransigence left Zhang and Yang in a quandary. Zhang’s plan to force Chiang’s 
hand got nowhere. They promptly sought advice from the CCP and specifically 
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requested Zhou Enlai, whom Zhang greatly admired, to help move the matter forward 
in Xian.35  
 
When the CCP leaders in Baoan learned of the incident by telegram around 
noon on 12 December, they were both shocked and jubilant. Mao Zedong reportedly 
laughed wildly while some, including General Zhu De, thought it best to kill Chiang 
immediately.36 In the end it was decided that the Party must keep Zhang and Yang 
on side while it sought direction from the Comintern – and Mao drafted the telegram 
to Moscow.  
 
In his memoirs Zhang Guotao, who was present in Baoan as one of the top 
leaders though not in a dominant position, recalled that Zhou Enlai was dispatched to 
and arrived in Xian on 13 December, and the Comintern reply (drafted by Stalin 
himself) was received that same evening.37 According to Zhang, Stalin saw the 
Incident as staged by the Japanese in order to cause a civil war in China and reduce 
its capacity to resist Japanese aggression, and the Soviet Union must not fall into 
this trap. Stalin considered Chiang the only person who could lead China to resist 
Japan and he instructed the CCP to ensure the Incident would be resolved by 
forming a united front with Chiang as the leader.38 Zhang’s account is credible as we 
now know Stalin did see that it was in the Soviet Union’s interest that Chiang should 
lead China to resist Japanese aggression so that the Japanese militarists could not 
turn their attention to the Soviet Union. 
 
Zhang’s account has, however, been challenged by the Chinese historian 
Yang Kuisong who insists that the key decision to resolve the Xian Incident 
peacefully and by working with Chiang was reached by the CCP leadership before 
Stalin’s telegraphic instructions were received.39 He has provided evidence that the 
telegram from Stalin was not in fact received until three days later, on 16 December 
which was also the day when Zhou actually arrived in Xian though Yang got the 
latter’s date wrong himself.40 He also suggests that the telegram could not be 
deciphered and one that could be read was received on 20 December, the day after 
the Politburo meeting in which the key decisions were made. An independent source 
confirms that telecommunication between Baoan and Moscow, which was only 
established in June that year, was unreliable for some months and thus the 
possibility of genuine difficulties in telecommunication with Moscow happened cannot 
be eliminated.41   
 
This contradicts the interpretation of Hans van de Ven who suggests 
unequivocally that the telegram caused the CCP to make a ‘u-turn’. According to him 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decided on 17 December to reverse the CCP’s 15 
December position of demanding Chiang be handed ‘over to a people’s tribunal’ into 
one of calling ‘for a peaceful settlement and the protection of the safety of Chiang’.42 
In this matter the reliability of van de Ven’s interpretation is marred by the reality that 
it would have been very difficult, if not impossible for Zhou and Mao to have reached 
a joint decision and acted together on 17 December as Zhou was by then advising 
Zhang and Yang in Xian while Mao was physically in Baoan. To act together they 
would have to co-ordinate by telegrams, which were controlled by Zhang and Yang 
at the Xian end.  Van de Ven has not provided any evidence to suggest telegraphic 
coordination took place or that Zhang and Yang made telegraphic facilities in Xian 
available to Zhou for private and confidential communication with Baoan. While 
Baoan could and must have used this facility, which was monitored by Zhang and 
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Yang, to transmit instructions to Zhou, Mao could not have used it to consult Zhou on 
what to do next. In any event, the telegram from Moscow merely stated that Zhang 
Xueliang’s act was harmful to forming an anti-Japan united front and the CCP should 
seek a peaceful resolution of this incident.43 
 
As to Yang’s version no explanation has been provided, by him or anyone 
else, as to why it took the CCP two days before it asked Moscow on 18 December to 
resend this long awaited for and apparently extremely important telegram, after 
asserting that this telegram could not be deciphered.44 This could not have been a 
procedural failure or oversight by telegraphic clerks since several reminders were 
sent to Moscow before Stalin’s reply was first received. Likewise, Yang has not 
explained why the CCP decided on this matter on 19 December, after having 
decided to seek Comintern direction first and requested the re-sending of Stalin’s 
instructions the previous day. No one has explained the compelling reason why the 
CCP must decide how to react on 19 December, rather than wait for Stalin’s telegram 
to be transmitted again if the original could not be read at all.45  
 
Whether Mao and the CCP leadership decided to reverse within less than a 
week their initial consensus over Chiang – to put him on a show trial – under a direct 
telegraphic order from Moscow or not, they acted as Stalin had suggested or desired. 
The reality was that even if the key message in Stalin’s original telegraphic reply 
could not be read, the views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had already 
been publicly articulated, authoritatively in an editorial of the Pravda newspaper, the 
official organ of its Central Committee, on 14 December.46 
 
Unless the CCP allows unrestricted access to its archives of this period in full 
it is not possible to establish beyond doubt if the most important part of Stalin’s 
telegraphic instructions were successfully deciphered before the CCP reversed its 
policy or changed its position.. However, there is no compelling reason to dismiss the 
thrust of Zhang Guotao’s recollection though he misremembered the exact date – for 
both Zhou’s arrival in Xian and receipt of Stalin’s telegram, two events that did, as he 
correctly recalled, happen on the same day.47 Apart from saying both events took 
place three days earlier than they did, which made no difference to the sequence of 
the major events he recounted, there is no significant inaccuracy in the rest of his 
recollection.48  Indeed, according to Zhang Xueliang, Zhou knew Stalin’s position 
when they met in Xian as Zhou told him that Stalin did not approve of the incident 
and wanted Chiang to remain the leader of China.49  
 
On the issue of whether the CCP acted on Stalin’s instruction John Garver 
takes the view that Mao probably came to realize the great value of fomenting a war 
between the Kuomingtang regime and the Japanese. Garver thinks this might have 
contributed to the change in the CCP’s position. This could be the case. An 
alternative or additional, as the two are not mutually exclusive, explanation would be 
that the key message in Stalin’s telegram came through sufficiently clearly 
particularly if read in juxtaposition with the Pravda editorial. The request, transmitted 
two days later, for resending Stalin’s telegram was to ascertain if there were specific 
details Stalin outlined as the basis for a peaceful settlement, not the basic policy.50 
Hence, the CCP leadership felt confident to reverse its earlier decision even before 
Stalin’s telegram giving the specifics was received again. Whether Mao changed his 
mind before he received Stalin’s telegraphic instructions in full or not, ‘the fact 
remains that Moscow did intervene and that intervention helped bring about the 
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reversal of the CCP’s initial radical position’.51   
 
Changed priority  
 
All through his captivity and for two decades afterwards Chiang thought the 
Communists were behind Zhang and Yang in staging the mutiny and kidnapping.52 
Indeed he could not believe that Zhang staged and led the mutiny when his 
bodyguards first reported to him that they were under attack from soldiers of the 
Northeast Army in his Xian residence.53 Chiang’s belief that the Communists were 
behind this had a significant impact on how he assessed his predicament and 
worked out a solution.  
 
The Xian Incident did have a profound impact on Chiang. He had to confront 
the prospect of death as soon as he was found by rebel soldiers. In the first meeting 
Chiang had with Zhang as the latter’s prisoner, Chiang felt he could not dismiss the 
prospect of being executed after some sort of a show trial.54 Although unknown to 
him at the time, this was essentially what the CCP decided as their preferred 
outcome in an enlarged Politburo meeting held the following day, on 13 December.55 
It would be unusual if Chiang did not consider this possibility. In contrast, his 
repeated demand that his captors should either shoot him or treat him with dignity 
and respect was almost certainly meant to assert his moral authority and to 
strengthen his hand if he should negotiate subsequently as he lost control of the 
situation. They were not indications that he wished, as it is implied in his published 
account of the incident, to provoke his captors to kill him.56  But the threat to his life 
was real and was confirmed in the assessment of T.V. Soong, who went to Xian on 
20 December to seek a peaceful resolution. Soong concluded that ‘the 
Generalissimo’s life was in the greatest danger’.57 Chiang could not but reflected 
hard on what he had done and on alternatives that he could have chosen.  
 
Chiang undoubtedly also pondered what drove Zhang, the most patriotic of all 
former warlords whom he treated as a protégé,58 and an ‘old comrade’ Yang 
Hucheng to such an extreme measure.59 Although Chiang asserted that Zhang 
became repentant as Zhang was moved by his determination to resist Japan after 
reading his diary, the reverse was almost certainly closer to the truth.60 Zhang did 
read Chiang’s diary and noted entries showing Chiang’s determination to resist 
Japanese aggression but it had little impact on him.61 Zhang could not have been 
moved as Chiang claimed, since Zhang’s problem with Chiang was not over intention 
or determination but over priority - resist Japanese aggression first, or wait until the 
CCP had been exterminated.62 Even after Zhang had released Chiang and 
voluntarily escorted Chiang back to Nanjing to face the consequences of his act of 
mutiny,63 Zhang still insisted to Chiang that the most important of the eight conditions 
Zhang initially raised – reorganize the government – must be implemented.64  
 
In Xian it was Zhang’s willingness to take responsibility and his obvious 
sincerity in requesting Chiang to take leadership of a national united front to resist 
Japan that must have forced Chiang to reflect.65 It did not take long for Zhang and 
Yang to disagree intensely over how to move forward. Chiang noticed this as he 
noted, in his diary, Zhang’s repeated efforts to ensure soldiers from his own 
bodyguard regiment, rather than Yang’s men who were in control of Xian, would take 
charge of his personal safety.66 The patriotism of Zhang and the articulated wish of 
the nation to stand firm against further Japanese aggression could not have escaped 
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him as Chiang examined his predicament.67 While this did not amount to compelling 
pressure on Chiang to reverse his policy priority and accept the terms of his captors, 
he had to ponder whether adhering strictly to his policy priority was worthy of dying in 
the hands of the mutineers or the Communists. Should he be killed it would almost 
certainly result in a civil war that would facilitate Japanese aggression against 
China.68 In the early days of captivity Chiang had to confront seriously the prospect 
that he might not emerge alive. 
 
It was not until the fourth day of his incarceration, the day when the 
government in Nanjing started bombing the rebels from the air, on 16 December, that 
Chiang felt his personal safety was less at risk. This was because, in his assessment, 
Zhang’s remark that he needed four to seven days of peace to work out a solution 
meant Zhang must be seeking direction from Moscow. In his diary he noted: ‘my 
heart was at ease as the Soviet Union could not endorse their rebellious conduct and 
the Soviet Union never took Zhang seriously’.69 On the following day as the rebels 
reduced their specific demands from eight to four, Chiang thought this was the result 
of instructions from the Comintern.70 The fact that Chiang’s analysis was wrong since 
neither was due to instructions from Moscow is irrelevant. What was critically 
important was that Chiang believed the rebels would ultimately follow Stalin’s 
instructions. Whilst still a captive, Chiang confided in his wife, who had gone to Xian 
on 22 December to secure his release, that the key was held not by Zhang whom 
she knew well but by the Communists.71 
 
We now know, from his diary and papers of the 1930s, Chiang was 
determined to resist Japanese aggression, and he devoted a huge amount of 
resources to prepare for the eventual fight with Japan.  Indeed, before the Xian 
Incident, Chiang had been negotiating with the Soviet Union for about a year for 
Soviet support for China’s resistance against Japanese aggression in return for a 
political solution to the CCP.72 While the Chinese government had hoped to get a 
mutual defence treaty with the Soviet Union, the latter preferred a non-aggression 
pact.73 The Soviet refusal to sign a mutual defence treaty raised doubt as to its 
commitment to help China in the event of full scale war between China and Japan. 
 
Prior to the Xian Incident, Chiang had to focus on securing Soviet weapons 
and support in the event of war with Japan as he could not get a mutual defence 
treaty from Stalin.74 The fact that such negotiations were taking place was 
important.75 In the year long covert negotiations between Stalin and Chiang both took 
a utilitarian and calculating approach and ‘each was wary of the other’s intentions’.76 
Before he became a captive in Xian Chiang was not certain that the Soviet Union 
would support his government should it go to war with Japan. With Chiang believing 
in this juncture that Stalin’s intervention would be vital to his release he would take 
any message or powerful gesture from Stalin seriously. 
 
Such a gesture indeed materialized. During Chiang’s captivity Zhou Enlai let 
him know that his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Qingguo), who went to the Soviet 
Union in 1925 to study but had been kept as a hostage in the Soviet Union, would 
soon be allowed to return to China.77 Once this was mentioned to Chiang, he would 
have seen it as confirmation of the correctness of his analysis that he really was 
dealing, albeit in a shadowy way, with Stalin. However Zhou might have articulated it 
Chiang could not have failed to see that only Stalin, not the CCP, could promise the 
release of Ching-kuo. The issue of Ching-kuo’s release had in fact been used as a 
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bargaining chip earlier in the decade. In June 1931 an agent of the Comintern’s Far 
Eastern Bureau, Hilaire Naulen, was captured by Chiang’s government, which 
mistook him to be the head of the Far Eastern Bureau. The Soviet Union made an 
offer to trade the release of Naulen and his wife for the return of Ching-kuo, but this 
was rejected by Chiang.78 The CCP was not involved in this negotiation. Thus, when 
Chiang was informed of Ching-kuo’s impending release, he could not but have seen 
it as an important message from Stalin. Thinking he knew Stalin for what he was, it 
would be reasonable for Chiang to think Stalin was essentially telling him that they 
should look at the big picture in finding a way to end the Xian Incident.79  
 
As to what Stalin wanted specifically Chiang could only surmise, as he chose 
not to negotiate directly with Zhou Enlai whether Zhou could actually represent Stalin 
or not. From Chiang’s perspective what Stalin wanted would have to be something in 
the strategic interest of the Soviet Union. He could reasonably have concluded that 
Stalin wanted him to live and lead China to resist Japanese aggression so that Japan 
could not turn its attention to the Soviet Union or, at least, get pinned down in China 
by the Chinese Army supported by the USSR.  What he was willing to concede was 
to open or, rather, re-open negotiations with the CCP to form a united front, 
something about which he had had parallel negotiations with the CCP for a year.80 In 
return he wanted an implicit Soviet promise to provide support in their resistance 
against Japan in the event of war. This was not an unreasonable assumption for him 
in light of the covert negotiations his representatives had with the Soviet Union and 
the CCP in parallel. Chiang understandably preferred to negotiate an agreement 
after his release rather than under duress in Xian, though he had made a moral 
commitment to find a way to reach an agreement subsequently.  
 
The Deal 
  
The deal that Chiang made to secure his own release consisted of two parts. 
They were a commitment along the line of what Chiang speculated Stalin wanted, 
and the specific verbal agreement that Chiang’s brother-in-law T.V. Soong (who held 
no government office at the time) and Madam Chiang (nee May-ling Soong) 
negotiated with Zhang, Yang and Zhou.  
 
Chiang adamantly refused to get personally drawn into the latter negotiations 
and authorized the Soong siblings to reach an oral agreement with them. Chiang was 
willing to reverse the priority between fighting Japanese aggression and suppressing 
the Communists in order to avoid a civil war and his own death on two conditions. 
The first was that he was not made to appear to yield to his captors to save his own 
skin. For this reason Chiang would not negotiate directly with Zhang, Yang and Zhou 
though he endorsed the principles underlying the verbal agreement with them. He 
would not overtly do a deal under duress or compromise on maintaining his sense of 
dignity.81 The second condition was that the Communist Party must declare their 
support for his government. An understanding could be reached as Zhou knew 
Chiang’s sensitivities and showed great diplomatic skill.  
 
Although Zhou had repeatedly asked to see Chiang, Chiang declined to meet 
him until the evening of 24 December. By then the Soong siblings had already 
reached a verbal agreement with Zhang, Yang and Zhou. This meeting happened 
because Zhou insisted on it. Chiang finally conceded but on the condition that it was 
only a meet and greet affair.82 Chiang’s record shows that this meeting did happen 
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and no negotiation took place.83 But Chiang reversed his previous decision not to 
have any exchange of substance with Zhou the following morning. Since the only 
event that happened between the evening of 24 December and the morning of 25 
December was the ‘meet and greet’ affair, this would have to be the occasion when 
Zhou passed on, most probably by way of polite pleasantries, the all important 
message from Stalin that Chiang Ching-kuo was well and would be returning to 
China soon.84 What else could have caused Chiang to change his mind over the 
issue of speaking to Zhou personally? 
 
Indeed, Chiang met Zhou again in the presence of T.V. Soong in the morning 
of 25 December, the day of his actual release. This was the only meeting in which 
Chiang agreed beforehand that he would discuss with Zhou the basis for future 
cooperation and, in reality, the terms of his release. According to Soong, Zhou 
explained:  
[F]or one year the communists had tried to avoid fighting in order to preserve 
the national strength. They have not made any capital out of the Sian incident 
and the measure suggested were the same that they put forward months ago. 
Now they want his personal assurance (1) to stop剿共[jiaogong or 
exterminate the Communists]; (2) to enrol the communists to fight Japan; (3) 
to be allowed to send some representative to explain to him in Nanking.85 
In Chiang’s own personal account, which was not published and was undoubtedly 
written to cast himself in a positive light but its substantive points are corroborated in 
Soong’s diary entry, he told Zhou:  
You must know that your wish of I saying “No extermination of the 
Communists from now on” is something that I cannot say now. You have to 
know that I have devoted my whole life to achieve national unification and the 
centralized command of the armed forces of the nation…. If you and your 
colleagues will not undermine national unity, will obey the Central Government, 
and fully accept my command as part of a united army, I will not only not seek 
to destroy you but will also treat you in the same way as other army units.86 
To this Zhou simply replied: ‘The Red Army will accept Mr Chiang’s command, will 
support unification under the Central Government, and will not undermine it.’87 
Notwithstanding the positive gloss put on this exchange it probably captured the spirit 
of the exchange.88  
 
This understanding could not have been reached so easily without Zhou’s 
diplomatic flair and his insistence on passing Stalin’s message in the ‘meet and greet’ 
meeting. Zhou gave Chiang time to ponder and work out the meaning of Stalin’s 
message. He ensured Chiang did not feel his sense of dignity and authority had been 
affronted. As Soong noted in his diary, after this brief exchange Zhou left and said to 
Soong ‘the Generalissimo was exhausted so he would not talk too much to him but 
that there are certain things’ to be confirmed between him and Soong, adding that ‘as 
an old subordinate he knows the Generalissimo is a man of his word’.89 The basic 
deal was, in plain language, to open negotiations after Chiang’s release for a united 
front against Japan under Chiang’s leadership, with details of arrangements to be 
worked out later and on the understanding that Soviet assistance would be available 
in the event of war with Japan. In other words, Chiang and Zhou did not reach an 
agreement to form a second united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP in 
Xian. 
 
As to the more specific, and from Chiang’s perspective secondary, part of this 
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deal, the starting point was based on the original eight demands that Zhang and 
Yang announced immediately after the kidnapping and without the input of the 
Communists. They were:  
1. Reorganize the government in Nanjing … to enable all parties to join in and 
take part to save the nation. 
2. Stop all civil wars. 
3. Immediately release all patriots arrested in Shanghai. 
4. Release political prisoners in the whole country. 
5. Allow popular movements that promote the national salvation movement. 
6. Protect the political rights and freedom for all people to form political 
parties and hold demonstrations. 
7. Truly implement Sun Yat-sen’s will. 
8. Immediately convene a national salvation meeting.90 
 
With the injection of the CCP’s own demands and Yang’s concern over 
whether Chiang would go back on whatever agreement he might reach once he 
returned to Nanjing, a somewhat different set of ten points were agreed in the final 
unwritten understanding. Reached between Zhang, Yang and Zhou on the one side 
and the Soong siblings on the other they were, according to Zhou: 
1. Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kung) and Soong will form a new government that 
excludes pro-Japanese individuals. 
2. Withdrawal of Central Army units from the northwest. 
3. Release of ‘patriotic leaders’. 
4. End the campaign to exterminate the CCP. Rename the Red Army and put 
it under a united command when a war of resistance against Japan is 
started, three months later. 
5. Reorganize the Kuomintang within three months and involve others in the 
government. 
6. Staged release of all political prisoners. 
7. CCP to be allowed to operate openly when a war of resistance is started. 
8. In terms of foreign policy: ally with the Soviet Union and liaise with Britain, 
the United States and France. 
9. Chiang to take responsibility for the Incident and resign from the office of 
Premier. 
10. The CCP agrees to support T.V. Soong against the pro-Japan faction 
within the central government and keep a secret agent in Shanghai to 
liaise with Soong.91 
 
After he returned to Nanjing, Chiang did not keep all the specific promises his 
agents made to Zhang, Yang and Zhou. But he honoured the brief verbal undertaking 
he himself made to Zhou. Chiang appeared to have made a distinction between the 
two though the latter was in effect included in the former. The latter had to be 
implemented for two reasons. It was a matter of personal honour for him.  More 
importantly, this implicit undertaking to reverse the national priority was predicated 
on Stalin agreeing to come to China’s assistance in a future war with Japan, 
something he had wanted for some time. He treated the rest of the unwritten 
understanding agreed to by the Soong siblings as a list of additional policy changes 
to be implemented if possible. This suggests the apparently changed atmosphere in 
the country was not enough to require Chiang to fulfil all the terms for his own 
release.  
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 In dealing with Zhang and Yang, Chiang tried to appear magnanimous. 
Although the kidnapping was for all intents and purposes a mutiny none of its leaders 
was given a death sentence. Zhang, the leader of the mutiny who voluntarily 
surrendered himself was promptly tried and sentenced to ten years imprisonment in 
a court-martial.92 Chiang then requested clemency and put him under the supervision 
of the Military Commission, which in effect meant putting Zhang under house arrest 
in a comfortable setting.93 Yang, who remained in Xian, tried to negotiate specific 
arrangements that would protect his power base. After the Northeast Army imploded 
as an organization in the absence of Zhang and units of his own 17th Route Army 
switched allegiance to Nanjing in early 1937, Yang was required to relinquish his 
command, and travel overseas at government expense for six months.94 He was 
removed from the Army List, and was put under de facto house arrest after he 
returned to China.95  
   
 Although working out the future of Zhang and Yang was politically delicate, it 
was largely a matter of striking a balance between pre-empting future mutinies and 
projecting an image that Chiang was fair, honourable, strict with military discipline 
and yet apparently magnanimous. Chiang could not afford to let the rebels keep the 
northwest outside of the central government’s authority after staging a mutiny. It 
would otherwise have rekindled residue warlordism. He achieved his objective by a 
careful deployment of central government forces to put pressure on the rebels – a 
clear violation of one of the terms for his release - and allowed internal tension 
among the rebels to unravel their coalition. In this Chiang largely succeed, which 
implied the non-fulfilment of some of the key terms Zhang and Yang imposed for his 
release. 
 
 The truly monumental decisions Chiang had to make after the Xian kidnapping 
concerned what to do with the CCP, China’s relations with the Soviet Union, and the 
national expectation that his government would stand up to further Japanese 
aggression. All three issues were closely intertwined. Indeed, if Chiang thought the 
formation of a united front with the CCP was not critical to securing Soviet aid, there 
would have been no greater need for him to honour his pledge to Zhou than for the 
understandings reached with Zhang and Yang. While Chiang did feel his sense of 
honour should require him to uphold the gentlemen’s agreement he did break other 
promises.  In the end, as will be explained below, it was his belief that national 
interest took precedent that caused him to treat the CCP differently for 
considerations over the big picture. 
 
Decisions leading to war 
 
   Chiang had been determined to stand up against Japan and remove repeated 
Japanese humiliation at least since the Mukden Incident of 1931 when the Japanese 
Army forcefully seized control of Manchuria, though he also saw the need to 
accommodate repeated Japanese aggressions until China had built up the capacity 
to resist.96 While the outburst of popular patriotism during the Xian Incident must 
have affected him, it does not mean he had as a result made up his mind to go to war 
when the Japanese make their next aggressive move. To act on the articulated 
patriotism would have been emotionally easy for him. But as a hardnosed realist 
whose decisions had implications for national survival he could not afford to act on 
emotion or popular expectation. In terms of his determination, it should be 
recognized that even though he kept this secret he had already ordered in October 
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1936, before the Xian Incident, the stockpiling of aviation fuel, pre-positioning of 
ammunition in strategic locations, and planning by government departments to 
relocate inland.97 The efforts to build defensive structure in the event of a conflict with 
Japan focused on the Shanghai-Nanjing area, with additional defensive installations 
also built further up the Yangzi River all the way to Wuhan.98 The critical issues for 
him after the Xian Incident remained, however, how to secure the resources to resist 
Japan, and when and where to stand and fight.  
 
After 1931 Chiang had worked on the basis that the Chinese government 
needed several years to build up its military and political capacity and to eliminate the 
CCP and residual warlordism in order to stand united against the might of Japan. 
This was the fundamental consideration behind the policy of ‘pacifying the country 
before resisting the external threat’ (攘外必先安内).99 The Xian Incident gave him an 
opportunity to rethink this strategy. Starting in early 1937 Chiang gave higher priority 
to the avoidance of a civil war.100  
 
But the reality continued to be that China did not have the military and 
logistical capability to defeat Japan. Even its capacity to resist a major Japanese 
military incursion over any period of time was limited. A top secret document among 
Chiang’s papers reveals that in 1937 the Chinese Army had only 190 million bullets 
in stock, whereas by the calculation of its planners the Army would need 300 million 
bullets to sustain 50 divisions in a month of full scale war.101 The only way that China 
could resist a major Japanese incursion was for it to secure external support and 
supplies. Chiang thought that the democratic countries like Britain, France and the 
United States of America would offer no help in the event of China going to war with 
Japan.102 Hence, to reverse China’s defence priority he must first get the Soviet 
Union committed to support it in war - knowing full well that the price was to find a 
political, rather than a military, solution to the CCP 
 
 To proceed, Chiang needed to ascertain in parallel the intentions of both 
Stalin and the CCP leadership. The attitude of Stalin was pivotal, as the real issue 
was the reliability of Soviet military assistance in the event of war. The reaffirmation 
of Stalin’s goodwill and willingness to help materialized in April, as the Soviet 
Ambassador Dimitri Bogomoloff informed Chiang that ‘the Soviet Union would 
provide China with military hardware should a war with Japan break out.’103 This was 
quickly followed by the promised return of Chiang Ching-kuo to China.104  
 
Chiang did not immediately respond to these Soviet moves as the Soviet 
Union still insisted on signing a mutual non-aggressive treaty, which would have 
required the Chinese Government to accept the Soviet Union’s privileged position in 
Outer Mongolia and over the Chinese Eastern Railway.105 Chiang dropped 
reservation over this after the start of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. On 8 July 1937, 
the day after the incident started, Chiang pondered if the incident would turn into ‘a 
total war of resistance’, for which China was not yet ready. As he did so he decided 
the ‘most critical’ issues were to reach ‘an agreement with the USSR for the supply of 
military equipment and the conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty.’106  
 
 The attitude of the CCP was also significant as Chiang conceded the CCP 
‘should be accepted back into the fold under certain conditions, but it must be kept 
within defined perimeters.’107 He was not prepared to allow the CCP use a war 
against Japan to rebuild its political and military might so that it could seize power 
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after the end of the war. It was with this in mind that Chiang insisted on several 
conditions for forming a united front with the CCP, viz.: no military command above 
divisional level (which was a roughly 10,000 men unit); no maintenance of a territorial 
base; and the transformation of the CCP forces into regular units of the National 
Revolutionary Army of specified strength.108 This marked a great concession on 
Chiang’s part as the maximum number of Communist troops he had previously been 
willing to allow in the secret negotiations that took place prior to the Xian Incident 
was only 3,000.109 The other matters involved were relatively easy to fudge but the 
CCP refused to accommodate Chiang’s core demands.  As late as June 1937 
Chiang still tried to persuade Zhou that the CCP should accept the central 
government’s bottom line so that an agreement for a united front could be 
reached.110 Prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident Chiang thought the CCP was 
insincere in its offer to cooperate but he saw no alternative to negotiation111 – as long 
as he was still seeking a Soviet commitment to help China in the event of war with 
Japan.  
 
 In the end the Marco Polo Bridge incident happened before Chiang could 
complete his negotiations with Stalin and the CCP. It forced his hand. Chiang had to 
make choices and monumental decisions with little time to consider their long term 
consequences.  
 
Although the initial incident was contained after the missing Japanese soldier 
was found, Mao surmised that Chiang would have to back down in his conditions for 
forming a united front if the Japanese forces resumed hostilities.112 On 27 July, the 
date the Japanese Kwantung Army launched a new assault against Beijing after a lull 
Mao thought war could no longer be avoided and instructed Zhou not to negotiate 
further with Chiang until the latter started making concessions.113 Mao’s assessment 
was accurate – Chiang noted in his diary that evening that he did not see how war 
could be avoided.114  
 
On 22 August, the day after Chiang’s government signed a non-aggressive 
pact with the Soviet Union and nine days after fighting started in Shanghai, Chiang 
quietly conceded to Mao’s terms for a united front.115 But no formal agreement was 
signed. The Communist forces became the 8th Route Army simply by an instruction 
issued by Chiang. Chiang accepted ‘the united front’ as a price to secure Soviet 
military aid.  
 
In fact when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident happened Chiang adopted a dual 
track approach. He did not simply decide to stand and fight. On the one hand he tried 
to settle this new Japanese provocation by negotiation but only if diplomacy could 
restore the status quo ante.116 On the other hand, mindful of Stalin’s promise of 
support, he prepared for war and was not willing to accept humiliating terms similar 
to those that had  settled previous incidents. Thus, he quickly took steps that put 
China’s armed forces on a war footing and prepared to open a second front if the 
Japanese militarists should push further. The latter materialized when the Japanese 
assaulted Beijing on 27 July and seized it the following day.117   
 
In addition to rushing reinforcements to North China Chiang deployed the 
most elite divisions of the Central Army, the German trained and equipped 87th, 88th 
and 36th divisions, to Shanghai. As he did so he violated the 1932 agreement that 
settled the Shanghai Incident of 1931.118 On 11 August he instructed them to 
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advance to designated assault areas. Chiang ordered them in the evening of 13 
August to launch a full scale attack on Japanese Marines in Shanghai and open a 
second front in an area where he had made the best preparation for war.119 In so 
doing he took a risk. Counting on Soviet support – albeit at a price - Chiang was 
prepared to fight a ‘long’ war of resistance but he also hoped that a robust defence of 
Shanghai, where the Western powers had vast interests, could get them to intervene 
and force Japan to agree to a settlement less prejudicial to China’s interests. In the 
end the battle captured the imagination of both combatant nations and marked the 
point of no return in transforming the Marco Polo Bridge Incident into the full scale 
War of Resistance.  
 
 Indeed, the day after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident Chiang sought to 
strengthen China’s capacity to fight by securing Soviet support. On 8 July Chiang 
approached the Soviet Union for a mutual defence agreement, which he had long 
sought.120 After the battle of Shanghai started he asked the Soviet Union if she would 
consider joining the war.121 Stalin rejected both requests as his motive was to tie the 
Japanese down in China so that they could not attack the Soviet Union. He had no 
wish to get the Soviet Union directly involved in the war. However, Stalin did fulfil his 
side of the bargain that Chiang thought was implicitly raised in Xian, though not 
without conditions. The Soviet Union responded to Chiang’s request for support by 
insisting on signing a non-aggressive pact as a condition for providing weapons to 
China.122 Once large scale fighting with the Japanese started Chiang could no longer 
afford to worry about the long term implications for Chinese sovereignty in Outer 
Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway. He authorised the signing of such an 
agreement on 21 August, less than ten days after fighting commenced in 
Shanghai.123 In return the Soviet Union delivered 400 aircraft and other matériel 
valued at over 100 million Chinese yuan by the middle of October.124 
 
Indeed, Soviet aircraft and pilots challenged the Japanese dominance of the 
sky after the Chinese Air Force suffered horrendous losses by the end of the battle of 
Shanghai.125 To illustrate the scale of Soviet support in the early years of the war, 
Chiang requested matériel to equip 20 divisions of the Chinese Army from the Soviet 
Union in 1938 alone.126 In the course of the Wuhan battle in the third quarter of 1938, 
Stalin indicated that he would consider providing arms for up to 60 divisions and an 
additional 500 aircraft.127 Chiang did not get everything he requested but Soviet 
matériel  was critical to sustain China’s war efforts up to March 1941.128 It was 
provided to serve Soviet interest and formally paid for by Chinese strategic 
minerals.129 The additional informal price Chiang had to pay was to allow the CCP to 
continue to exist. The most important assumption Chiang made over the intentions of 
Stalin when he was a captive in Xian was vindicated. 
   
Conclusions 
 
 Although the attitude of Stalin was critical to the resolution of the Xian Incident, 
Hans van de Ven is not fully justified to pronounce that the CCP simply reversed 
itself upon receiving a direct telegraphic order from Stalin to do so. Stalin’s attitude 
undoubtedly influenced how the CCP handled the incident. It was also seen by 
Chiang as the most important factor in securing his own release. But van de Ven’s 
contention is not supported by available evidence. Young-Tsu Wong’s claim, from 
the opposite spectrum, that Chiang was released not by order of Moscow but 
because he met his real captors’ terms contradicts evidence available as well. 
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Equally, Yang Kuisong’s assertion that the CCP made the key fateful decision on its 
own is unconvincing. The reality was that the CCP and Mao reversed their initial 
position to one that dovetailed that of Stalin within a week. The weight of evidence 
suggests the top CCP leaders did not make this change under a direct telegraphic 
order from Stalin on16 December but did so after they came to know Stalin’s views.  
 
One must not lose sight of the reality that Stalin’s attitude represented at most 
one of the key factors for a solution. It would not have been decisive if Chiang did not 
react as Stalin hoped he would. Respond Chiang did. Once he saw that Stalin had 
signalled him to look at the big picture he found it possible to endorse in front of Zhou 
an agreement his agents reached with his captors and Zhou. If T.V. Soong’s 
assessment in his diary is correct even as late as 24 December, the day Zhou 
passed on Stalin’s message that Chiang Ching-kuo would soon be allowed to return 
to China and one day before Chiang’s release, the deal could still have collapsed 
and Chiang might have refused to endorse it personally. Such an assessment was 
corroborated by Chiang’s own private record.130 Whether Chiang would have done a 
deal with his captors if he had not received Stalin’s signal cannot be known with 
certainty. But once Chiang thought he got confirmation of Stalin’s intention in the 
evening of 24 December, he stopped being reticent in dealing with his captors who 
were prepared to release him. He cooperated with Zhang and had a substantive 
conversation with Zhou that secured his own release within twenty-four hours. Yang, 
who was concerned about his own safety after Chiang returned to Nanjing, was left in 
the cold by both Zhang and the Communists. 
 
 Zhou’s diplomatic flair greatly facilitated this process but the evidence 
available does not confirm the popular belief in China, reiterated by Jay Taylor, that 
Zhou played an indispensible and pivotal role. Neither Zhou, nor the CCP nor Stalin 
could have required Zhang and Yang to release Chiang. What really made a 
settlement possible were Stalin’s astuteness in signalling Chiang his commitment to 
support China in a war against Japan, and Chiang’s success in reading and 
responding positively to this signal. Zhou’s greatest contributions were two. First he 
insisted on having the ‘meet and greet’ meeting on 24 December and thus created an 
opportunity to pass on Stalin’s message. The second was to assess correctly what 
Chiang would tolerate in how to endorse the deal without appearing to have done so 
under duress, and thus maintained his sense of dignity and vanity. An alternative 
Communist representative might not have Zhou’s touch but as long as he did not 
offend Chiang directly, it is reasonable to conclude that Chiang, who was always 
looking at ‘the big picture’ would still have tolerated the deal, once Stalin’s message 
and ‘sincerity’ was conveyed. 
 
The Xian Incident did have great consequences. To be sure it did not change 
Chiang and make him suddenly determined to fight Japan. It also did not produce an 
oral agreement for the forming of a second united front between the Kuomintang and 
the CCP, as  has been taken for granted. Reaching an understanding with Zhou 
Enlai that he would, after his release, negotiate with the CCP did not amount to 
reaching an agreement. Previous negotiations between them did not produce 
anything like a united front and the risk of failure remained real. The reality was that 
Chiang had been determined to resist Japanese aggression for several years, and 
had had covert negotiations with the Soviet Union and the CCP as he prepared to 
confront forcefully Japanese aggression. What the Incident did do was to induce 
Chiang to alter his priority as he changed the assessment of the likelihood of Soviet 
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support in the event of a war with Japan.   
 
Before Xian Chiang preferred to unify the country, which included 
exterminating the CCP, in order to get China ready to go to war against Japan. After 
the Incident he decided that he and his government should take a robust stance 
against the next aggressive move of the Japanese militarists. For this he needed 
external support. The only realistic source was the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding the 
year long covert negotiations that preceded the Xian Incident it was as a captive in 
Xian that Chiang felt sufficiently confident that Stalin was looking at the big picture - 
how to confront and survive the rising ambition of the Japanese militarists against 
their respective countries - as he was. He thought he got confirmation of this when 
Stalin made the grand gesture of promising to release his son Chiang Ching-kuo. It 
showed that Stalin wanted him alive and would support him to lead China in a war 
resisting Japan. Chiang did not reach a specific and clear agreement over this with 
his Communist interlocutor Zhou Enlai but he could see the Soviet Union’s self 
interest would make such an implicit deal a real commitment. But since the price for 
Soviet support and his own release was for Chiang to form a united front with the 
CCP, he agreed in principle to work for one after his release.  
 
 While the Xian deal was critical to Chiang’s decision to make a stand over the 
Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the former did not lead to the latter. Up to 7 July 1937 
Chiang had reached no agreement with the CCP (and did not implement roughly half 
the terms for his own release in Xian), let alone make joint preparations, in 
anticipation of an incident like that which took place in the Marco Polo Bridge area. 
The Incident took him by surprise. His reactions were not based on a pre-conceived 
plan.  The changed political situation and atmosphere, unfolding events, and above 
all his new assessment of Stalin’s intentions guided Chiang in his responses. Under 
his leadership China drifted into the War of Resistance as his attempt to open a 
second front in Shanghai escalated out of control. The War of Resistance was not 
the result of an agreement reached with the CCP at or shortly after the Xian Incident 
to form a united front in order to wage a full scale war against Japan. 
 
 After Xian Chiang focused on finding a way to incorporate the CCP into the 
mainstream politics of China on the conditions that the CCP would adhere to the 
Three Principles of the People, give up holding on to a territorial base, and integrate 
its military forces into the National Revolutionary Army. Chiang was willing to let CCP 
members and soldiers to join in the war that he was going to wage against Japan in 
due course. But there was no set timetable. Chiang agreed to let the CCP survive for 
a while but not to revive. This was the price he knew he had to pay to secure Soviet 
military aid in the event of war with Japan. Chiang still tried to eliminate the CCP as a 
threat by political means.131  
 
But the CCP had a different agenda. It was not willing to be assimilated by the 
KMT or be integrated into a KMT led and dominated political framework. Chiang was 
still negotiating with the CCP when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident happened. In 
spite of the public rhetoric Mao did not respond to Chiang’s appeal to patriotism. He 
saw an opportunity and seized on the Japanese aggression to force Chiang’s hand.  
 
 Chiang had to make a choice. He decided to stand and fight unless diplomacy 
could restore the status quo ante, and urged the CCP to be patriotic and support the 
war efforts in the spirit of the proposals he had already put to it. Mao capitalized on 
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Chiang’s predicament and insisted on his own terms. As events unfolded Chiang 
made significant concessions to the CCP to form the united front in order to secure 
Soviet matériel.  Chiang could afford to make a stand against the Japanese as he felt 
confident that Stalin would supply him with weapons and ammunition, provided he 
would pay the price Stalin wanted vis-à-vis the CCP.  
 
By allowing the CCP to keep its territorial base, independent existence and for 
its forces to be organized into a corps of three divisions called ‘the Eighth Route 
Army’ with its own general headquarters Chiang basically accepted Mao’s terms. In 
return he obtained vital Soviet weapons and military supplies that sustained China in 
the early years of the war. Chiang brought his regime scope to survive the Japanese 
onslaught at the price of, with the benefit of hindsight, allowing the CCP to revive and 
prepare to contest the future of China after the end of the War of Resistance against 
Japan.  
 
The release of Chiang’s presidential papers in Taipei and his diary in the 
Hoover Institution has been indispensible in helping to explain why Chiang did what 
he did. This in turns provides a good impetus to review and rethink some of the 
assumptions of the history of Republican China, in this case the causal relationship 
between the Xian Incident and the start of the War of Resistance against Japan, as 
well as the Nanking government’s assessment of the relevance and significance of 
the CCP and the Soviet Union.  
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